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LEGISLATION NOTE
ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES:
PROPOSED STANDARDS AND DETERMINATION PROCEDURES
Don't I think a poor man has a chanst in court? Iv course he has. He has
the same chanst there that he has outside. He has a splendid poor man's
chanst.
Mr. Dooley in The Choice of Law
INTRODUCTION: THE SCOPE
The poor man Mr. Dooley refers to remains an elusive figure in the
states' administration of criminal justice. Uniform and reliable methods
are lacking to guide judicial officials and court officers in their determina-
tion of who is eligible for assigned counsel. Both objective, accurate stan-
dards and a workable, constitutionally sound procedure to determine eli-
gibility are needed and are necessary to guarantee the constitutional
right of counsel. The past five years have seen authoritative and defini-
tive studies analyze and discuss the poor person's plight in criminal pros-
ecutions. The Committee on Poverty and The Administration of Federal
Criminal Justice recommended that:
Legislation should define persons eligible for appointment of counsel and other
defense services at government expense as persons financially unable to obtain
adequate representation.'
The American Bar Foundation report recommended the establishment of a
uniform, flexible, and objective system for eligibility guidelines in state
courts.2 Whereas the Committee's report bore fruition with the enactment
of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,3 the Foundation's report remained
largely unheeded by state courts. The eligibility guidelines recommended
by the reports of 1963 and 1965 need ever the more so to be concretely
established in 1968. This comment attempts to waken the slumbering state
administrators of criminal justice by analyzing and proposing eligibility
standards and procedures to effectuate the poor person's constitutional
guarantee of appointed counsel.
1 1963 ATT'Y GEN. REP., POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JusTIcE 41 (1963).
2 SILVERSTEIN, DFENSE OF THE POOR 115-116 (1965).
3 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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Prior case rulings and legislative enactments employed the ambiguous
standard of "indigency" to determine eligibility.4 These same courts and
legislative bodies shied away from any definition or in depth analysis of
"indigency."' 5 Consequently this lack of definitive guidelines led to several
inadequate methods of determination. One approach employed stringent
and somewhat arbitrary factors as a measure of who is eligible. Income
level maximums and asset limitations were established whereby all persons
above a certain income or in possession of certain assets would be conclu-
sively ineligible. At the same time, certain factors were established which
would automatically preclude appointment of counsel. 6 A second approach
defined indigency circularly by employing equally ambiguous terms, such
as destitute, poor, needy and pauper.7 A third approach, the most common,
simply allowed the judge to accept the defendant's statement about his in-
ability to afford counsel as determinative of the issue of eligibility.8
Each approach led to the same result: a denial of the constitutional
guarantee of appointed counsel to many unable to afford an attorney. The
first denied counsel arbitrarily to many poor persons who were entitled to
such right. The second method suffered from the constitutional infirmity
of vagueness and uncertainty. Obscure and undefined terminology did not
and does not effectively guarantee the appointment of counsel to eligible
defendants. The third approach burdened the courts, public defenders, ap-
pointed lawyers, and the public by measuring eligibility too leniently. This
leniency, while not intended to deny counsel to those entitled, in fact did
so. Understaffed public defenders and underpaid appointed attorneys did
not and cannot provide effective representation to masses of defendants.
The right to an appointed attorney presently extends only to those unable
to afford it and not to all defendants. 9 To indeterminately extend such
right obviates the constitutional guarantee of effective counsel to those in
4 State v. Hudson, 55 R.I. 141, 179 A. 130 (1935); People v. Logan, 137 Cal. App.
2d 331, 290 P.2d 11 (1955); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3 (1967); COL. REV. STAT.
§ 39-21-3 (1963).
5 See Stifler, Determining the Financial Status of An Accused, 54 ILL. B.J. 868, 879
(1966).
6 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MEMORANDUM ON RULES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR
LEGAL AID SERVICES (January 19, 1966).
7 Territory v. Restarick, 33 Haw. 273, 276 (1934) (destitute); Moore v. State Social
Security Commission, 233 Mo. App. 536, 541, 122 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1938) (necessitous,
needy, very poor). See Destitute of Bennington County v. Putnam Memorial Hospital,
125 Vt. 289, 293, 294, 215 A.2d 134, 138 (1965).
8 Beatty and Wilkinson, A Survey on Defense of Indigent Accused Persons in Alabama,
17 ALA. L. REV. 43, 47 (1964).
9 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; United States v. Sampson, 161 F. Supp.
216, 217 (D.C.C. 1958).
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fact eligible. Too-strict and too-lenient standards must be abolished and be
replaced by balanced eligibility standards and fair selection procedures to
vitiate present inequities in appointed counsel proceedings.
Accordingly, this comment will deal (1) with the constitutional basis of
the poor person's right to appointed counsel; (2) with a background in-
quiry into the problems and public policy of counsel systems; (3) with an
analysis of past and present eligibility standards and methods; (4) and
with practical proposals to guarantee effective appointed counsel to those
eligible.
THE EXTENSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL
The Constitutional and judicial basis for past and present concern over
the poor man's right to appointed counsel evolved through a number of Su-
preme Court decisions. Powell v. Alabama first articulated that "the right
to have counsel appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the
constitutional right to be heard by counsel."10 Powell established that the
right to appointed counsel is part and parcel of the due process guarantee
to a fair hearing where the accused is unable to employ counsel. Subse-
quently, within a decade, Johnson v. Zerbst held that in federal criminal
actions, the Sixth Amendment requires courts to provide counsel for those
unable to afford an attorney where the life and liberty of the accused is
at stake." Shortly thereafter, Williams v. Kaiser stated that the right to
appointed counsel is equally fundamental where the accused is "unable to
employ counsel to present his defense because he was without funds."' 2
10 287 U.S. 45, 72 (1932). Justice Sutherland speaking for the Powell Court further
noted:
The United States by statute and every state in the Union by express provision of law,
or by the determination of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge, where the
accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him. In most states the rule
applies broadly to all criminal prosecutions, in others it is limited to the more serious
crimes, and in a very limited number, to capital cases. A rule adopted with such unani-
mous accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to have counsel ap-
pointed, at least in cases like the present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion
we have reached as to the fundamental nature of that right.
Id. at 73.
11304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Court remarked:
The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safe-
guards it provides be lost, justice will not "still be done." It embodies a realistic recog-
nition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional
legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life
or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That
which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may
appear intricate, complex, and mysterious.
Id. at 462-463.
12323 U.S. 471, 474 (1945).
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Griffin v. Iliiois settled that a state cAnrit deny appellate review to a poor
person solely because 6f his poverty, but must hifford equal justice to rich
and poor alike.' 3 "Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no ra-
tional relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be
used as an excuse to deprive a defendaht of a fair trial."'1 4 Griffin placed a
duty on the states to alleviate financial inequities of defendants in crimi-
nal prosecutions, inequities which the state did not cause or impose but
which, if not remedied, would discriminate against poor persons. Follow-
ing Griffin, Gideon v. Wainwright at last established that the right to re-
tained and appointed counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair
hearing in a state criminal proceeding as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 15 The court stated:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.' 6
In addition, recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly Escobedo v. Il-
linois'7 and Miranda v. Arizona,'8 have further extended the right to coun-
sel and the right to appointed counsel at the request of eligible defendants
to the initial stage of the accusatorial process. 19 In summary, three consti-
tutional doctrines coalesce to form the foundation of the poor person's
13 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
'4 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 18 (1956). Justice Black commented:
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful, is an age old problem.
People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This hope, at
least in part, brought about in 1215 the royal concessions of the Magna Carta: "To no
one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or justice .... No free man
shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed;
nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers
or by the law of the land." These pledges were unquestionably steps toward a fairer
and more nearly equal application of criminal justice. In this tradition, our own con-
stitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in
criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different
groups of persons. Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of
our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is con-
cerned, "stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court."
Id. at 16-17.
15 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 9.
16 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 9, at 344.
17378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1s 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19 If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any inter-
rogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis
that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial
ability of the individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966).
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right to appointed counsel: due process, equal protection, and the right to
counsel.
But the right to appointed counsel remains a meaningless gesture unless
an adequate and reliable inquiry and investigation is made into the ques-
tion of the defendant's economic status. The denial of the right to counsel
in the absence of a sufficient check into the defendant's economic condition
yiolates constitutional guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the respective provisions of state constitutions and, where promulgated,
state statutes. The United States Supreme Court rulings cited above and
state supreme court decisions discussed below have well established by
constitutional bases the importance, if not the near necessity, of deter-
mining the right to counsel, retained or appointed, within a fair hearing.
Accordingly, such constitutionally sound decisions can only be enforced
where the determination of the inability to afford counsel proceeds by an
examination of the defendant's financial status and a subsequent investi-
gation into the accused's financial statement.
Denial of an adequate hearing to decide eligibility vitiates the defen-
dant's right to a fair hearing. Where the right to appointed counsel exists,
the failure of the court to make an effective appointment is a denial of
due process.20 It is the duty of the trial court to ascertain, after a full
and fair hearing on the defendant's financial status, the accused's qualifi-
cation for free counsel. 21 Whether the defendant possesses the financial
means to afford counsel is a factual question, which factual query cannot
be resolved without resorting to an adequate hearing on the facts.22
Courts have reversed and remanded decisions of appeal and have granted
writs of mandamus and prohibition where the trial judge acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in a determination of eligibility or where the examination
was at best a cursory questioning. 23 But the same and other courts have
not pronounced guidelines as to how an adequate hearing should proceed
and what an effective hearing should cover. Nevertheless, where any court
fails to accurately ascertain the accused's economic status with regard to
20 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). See Holmes v. United States, 370 F.2d
209, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
21 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) ; Blanton v. State, 229 Ind. 701, 702, 98 N.E.2d
186, 187 (1951) ; People v. Loftus, 400 Il. 432, 433, 81 N.E.2d 495, 497 (1948).
22 State v. Annaya, 76 N.M. 572, 573, 417 P.2d 58, 60 (1966).
2" Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1956); State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d
888 (Wis. 1967); Schmidt v. Uhlenhopp, 258 Iowa 989, 140 N.W.2d 118 (1966); Eliot
v. District Court in and for the City and County of Denver, 157 Col. 229, 404 P.2d 65
(1965); State v. Burke, 128 N.W.2d 422 (Wis. 1964) ; Petition of George Jones, 143
Mont. 309, 387 P.2d 712 (1963) ; In Re Patterson's Petition, 132 Col. 401, 317 P.2d 1041
(1957) ; Hendryx v. State, 130 Ind. 265, 29 N.E. 1131 (1892).
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appointed counsel, that court transgresses the defendant's due process guar-
antee of counsel.24
In addition to the due process infirmity, lack of an adequate uniform
hearing to determine eligibility denies equal protection to the accused. Vari-
ous surveys point up that within the same state, and even within the same
county, one defendant may be found eligible for counsel in one district
but not in another.25 The disparity in intrastate proceedings violates the
poor person's right to the uniform application of the constitutional guar-
antee of counsel.26
In addition to the constitutional infirmities, a number of states have en-
acted statutes providing for appointed counsel where the defendant is "in-
digent" or "insolvent" or "unable to afford counsel.127 Several state su-
preme courts have addressed themselves to a proper determination of
eligibility and have held that the applicable statutes have imposed on the
courts the affirmative obligation of ascertaining that eligibility by a thor-
ough inquiry and investigation. 2 8 Any failure in the court's duty would re-
sult in a breach of the statutory provision and in "an improper depriva-
tion of the right to counsel."2 9 Thus where legislatures have effectuated
by enactment the right to appointed counsel, an inadequate inquiry vio-
lates constitutional rights and statutory guarantees.
As a corollary concern of the appellate courts in regard to a serviceable
eligibility examination, the practical problem of a, sufficient record on ap-
24 To ask and demand a thorough examination into eligibility for counsel is in keeping
with other constitutionally guaranteed procedures. Due process requires the determina-
tion of waiver of counsel to be accompanied by an in depth questioning. "A judge can
make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely
made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circum-
stances. . . ." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948). "The trial judge before
whom an accused, charged with a felony, appears without counsel, must make a thorough
inquiry to determine whether there is an understanding and intelligent waiver of counsel.
He must investigate to the end that there can be no question about the waiver ... "
Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909, 912 (10th Cir. 1965). To this end, the eligibility inquiry
should be no less thorough and decisive.
2 5 Infra note 54.
26See Richardson, Reardon, and Simeone, Legal Aid to Indigents, J. Mo. B. 525
(1963).
27 COL. REV. STAT. § 39-21-3 (1964) (indigent); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (1968) (in-
solvent) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-12 (1953) (unable to afford counsel).
28 Keur v. State, 160 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1963) ; Bogart v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 850, 386 P.2d 474 (1963) ; People v. Loftus, 400 I1. 432,
81 N.E.2d 495 (1948).
29 Bogart v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County Court, supra note 28, at 851, 386
P.2d at 475.
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peal or on a writ presents itself. If the record is not clear as to the method
of determination or as to the reasons the judge denied counsel, the defen-
dant may lose the appeal for failure to raise a reviewable question.80 A
uniform and thorough inquiry would also effectively afford the defendant a
sufficient record on appeal.
Further, the constitutional right to counsel as now interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court, extends to felony defendants at the initial
stage of the accusatory process3 1 to and including probation hearings3 2 and
to juvenile defendants at incarceration proceedings.3 3 The same constitu-
tional right may some day extend to misdemeanor defendants and to other
hearings such as criminal psychopath proceedings, mental determination
hearings, and drug addiction investigations.3 4 Presently, courts and legisla-
tures have already extended the right of counsel to less than felony cases
and other than trial hearings. 35
As the right encompasses different phases of the administration of crim-
inal justice, many more defendants, accused, and petitioners will demand
appointed counsel. In light of the absence of uniform and adequate pro-
cedures to determine eligibility this challenge cannot be met. In the end, the
right to appointed counsel must be guaranteed to those unable to afford coun-
sel. The determination to comply with constitutional safeguards cannot occur
in a vacuum or in a haphazard manner. Due process, equal protection, and
practical concerns demand a thorough investigation into eligibility.
A BACKGROUND INQUIRY INTO THE PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC
POLICY OF THE COUNSEL SYSTEM
Statistics conclude that a majority of criminal defendants are financially
unable to secure retained counsel and, hence, are eligible for appointed
counsel. The results of surveys vary. Percentage conclusions range from a
low of 507o to a high of 75% of defendants economically unable to procure
30 Conn. v. State, 251 Miss. 488, 170 So. 2d 20 (1964) ; Petition of George Jones, supra
note 23; People v. Loftus, supra note 28.
31 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 9; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 2 Wade v. Gilbert, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
33 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
84 Supra note 26, at 532.
35 Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. 3006A (1964); ARIz. REV. STAT. Title 11,
Ch. 3 § 11-581 (1964); COL. REV. STAT. § 39-21-1 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.710
(1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.14 (1965). State v. Borst, supra note 23. See generally,
Right to Counsel: A SymPosium, 45 MINN. L. R.v. 693-896 (1961).
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an attorney. 8 A realistic eligibility estimate would be 60%.37 In any event,
from any perspective, "The vast majority of our criminal defendants are
indigent [in need of appointed counsel] by any reasonable definition ... 2738
An eligibility system of standards and procedures must be uniform, work-
able, and just. Variations in local standards of living naturally make it im-
possible to propose nationwide uniform standards of eligibility measured in
dollars and cents. National guidelines cannot adequately accommodate nec-
essary adjustments in local economic and social conditions. 39 And likewise,
in a majority of states, state-wide guidelines could not realistically compen-
sate for the variance among divergent living standards between rural and
urban areas. Nevertheless, the test for eligibility should be carefully formu-
lated by state wide rule.40 While facts and figures on income levels and ex-
penditure rates may differ in several sections of a state, a uniform proce-
dure of determining eligibility may be adaptable to different economic and
population areas and would provide a state with one fair standard method
of determining those in financial need of counsel.
A system of determining eligibility must be viable. The method must be
efficient and effective, not cumbersome or too costly.41 Objective standards
must be employed, yet such a method must also be flexible so as to afford
discretionary power to the court official who determines eligibility. Fur-
thermore, the guidelines must be reliable, not hunches or opinions based on
hearsay.
The attorney appointment system must be just. The right to appointed
counsel extends not only to the destitute or penniless but also to others, in
less unfortunate situations who nevertheless are financially unable to obtain
counsel. Insolvency of the defendant is not a condition precedent. The con-
36 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 7 (50%) ; Oaks and Lehman, The Criminal Process of
Cook County and the Indigent Defendant, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 584, 660 (50-60%); Lum-
bard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice, 47 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 176,
177 (1964) (75%). Also see Stifler, supra note 5, at 870; and Dowling and Yantis,
Defense of the Poor in Illinois, 47 CHI. B. REC. 216 (1966).
37 Supra note 1, at 16.
-8 McCarthy and Wahl, The District of Columbia Bail Project, 53 GEo. L. J. 675, 679
(1965).
39 NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, A GuIDE TO ELIGIBILITY STAN-
DARDS FOR LEGAL AID SOCIETIES 1 (1965).
40 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR ADEQUATE DEFENSE SYSTEMS 5
(1964).
41 The determination procedure should take a minimal amount of time, reducing the
risk of adding another long delay to the growing bureaucratic administration of criminal
trials and appeals. The cost of the investigatory procedure should be as low as possible,
freeing funds for other costs of representation.
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stitutional guarantee of counsel envelops .the ifndigent and the "borderline
indigent. '42 Accordingly, counsel must be appointed on request to:
A person who at the time need is determined is not financially able to secure ade-
quate counsel for his defense out of present resources. 48
This standard encompasses not only persons without any money but also
those persons who do have some money or some equity. These latter per-
sons, if required to pay for counsel, would endure economic hardship. Not
to provide counsel for the "borderline indigent" would be to afford justice
to the penniless and to impose injustice on those with a few pennies. Ap-
pointed counsel must serve those unable to afford adequate representation,
and that can only be determined after an evaluation of the economic status
of the defendant and of the legal representation necessary to defend against
the particular crime alleged to have been committed.
Other factors affect the criteria of eligibility; The amount of funds avail-
able, the existence of other legal aid agencies, the ability of staff personnel,
the social decision of where to draw the "poverty" level line, and the con-
stitutional issue of when and to whom appointed counsel is available, all
contribute to the formation of financial guidelines. 44 The determination of
financial eligibility cannot be divorced from these myriad factors. Proposed
rules require the most careful consideration of the needs of the total com-
munity including the clients to be served and the attorneys to serve them.
In the main, four programs exist from which counsel to be appointed
may be selected: public defender, private defender, assigned counsel, and
public-private defender systems.48 The scope of this comment does not en-
42 The "borderline indigent" is that defendant who has some funds but not sufficient
to hire adequate representation. Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon,
44 ORF. L. REV. 255, 263 (1965).
43 A person eligible for appointed counsel has been descriptively defined as: "... a
person who is financially unable to afford adequate representation at any critical stage
of the proceedings without regard to that point at which financial incapacity may occur
or appear," supra note 26, at 531; ".. . a person who at the time need is determined is
unable without undue hardship, to provide for the full payment of an attorney and all
other necessary expenses of representation," UNIFORM LAW COMMIUSSION.R'S MODEL DE-
FENSE OF NEEDY PERSONS ACT § 1(3) (1964); "[any person who . .. is not financially
able to secure counsel out of present or reasonably anticipated resources, considering the
special circumstances of the case," BROWNELL, LEOAL Am IN~ THE UNITED STATES 128
(1931); ". . . a defendant possessing no money or so little that he clearly meets the
standards by which the court determines those to whom counsel will be assigned," Note,
The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in The Federal District Courts, 76
HAv. L. REv. 579, 580 (1963).
44 See Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. URBAN L. 550
(1967).
4 5 Supra note 26, at 540.
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compass any discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each sys-
tem; a legion of material and articles have been published analyzing the
four methods.46 However, the proposed eligibility procedures outlined in
this comment can be employed in conjunction with any of these systems.
Any test to gauge financial eligibility must initially answer negatively
the question: would a private attorney be interested in the defendant's
case? 47 The appointed counsel system is not intended to and it should not
compete with private attorneys who may be willing to handle a defendant's
case for whatever fee defendant may afford.
In brief, the difficulties facing an effective and efficient economic eligi-
bility method are primarily practical. To verify the defendant's financial
status, to make the final determination of eligibility, to predict the cost
of a particular representation,48 these and other procedural matters are
fraught with practical difficulties. Nonetheless, appointed counsel, a consti-
tutional guarantee to the poor, must serve all applicants whose income
level and financial status prohibit retention of private counsel.49
AN ANALYSIS OF PAST AND PRESENT METHODS
OF DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY
There are three basic approaches to the determination of financial eli-
gibility. 0 One test employs specific, objective factors indicative of income,
assets, and other established economic criteria of the defendant. A second
method relies on subjective, impressionistic judgments made by the inter-
viewer as to the person's economic status. A third merges these two ap-
46 See generally, SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 15-74; Harrington and Getty, The
Public Dejender, 42 A.B.A.J. 1139 (1956) ; Searle, An Argument for the Public De-
fender System, 5 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 48 (1964); Panel Discussion, the Problems of
Adequate Representation of Indigents and Other Defendants in Criminal Cases, 36 F.R.D.
129-173 (1964) ; Note, Representation of Indigents in California: A Field Study of the
Public Defender and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REv. 522 (1961); and
AMERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (1967).
47 See BROWNEL, LEGAL Am IN THE UNrrED STATES 71 (1931).
48Note, Adequate Representation for Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 758, 771 (1966).
49 The American Bar Association's standards for an adequate defense counsel system
include:
Provide legal representation for every person who is without financial means to secure
competent counsel when charged with a felony, misdemeanor or other charge where
there is a possibility of a jail sentence. Provide standards of eligibility that do not ex-
tend assistance to one having sufficient funds or resources to secure competent counsel,
but, at the same time, are not so stringent as to create a class of unrepresented accused.
ASLERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR DEFENDER SYSTEM (1966).
5 0 Supra note 6.
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proaches and uses specific criteria as a guide to a discretionary determina-
tion of eligibility. The first method offers an objective, uniform basis for
determination, but all too often is based on unrealistic and unreliable fig-
ures and factors. The second test offers a flexible, discretionary procedure,
but frequently it leads to arbitrary and whimsical judgments. The third
method attempts to combine the virtues of the first two while eliminating
their respective defects. An analysis of past and present procedures of
states and of legal aid organizations to determine eligibility best elabo-
rates on the above approaches and on variations of the three methods.
Lee Silverstein, in his definitive work on the criminal poor,51 concluded:
(1) many counties have no system at all to determine eligibility; (2) in most
counties, judges are the sole determiner of whether the defendant is eli-
gible, relying on one or more factors listed below; (3) tests for eligibility
differ among counties in the same state and among judges in the same
county; and (4) a considerable number of prosecuting and defense attorneys
feel eligibility determination procedures to be too lenient.52 A follow-up
survey of eligibility standards and methods taken as a basis for this com-
ment supports the above three conclusions and three additional proposi-
tions.5 One, that the population of a county or a state greatly determines
the eligibility system employed. In rural counties and less populated states,
the determination is made by a judge based on his own personal knowledge
of the defendant or based on the personal familiarity of the attorneys or
other court officials with the financial situation of the defendant. Two, that
a large number of counties have adopted the affidavit or oath system of de-
ciding financial qualification by requiring the defendant to sign an affida-
vit stating that he is too poor to afford counsel and by relying on such
affidavit as conclusive evidence of eligibility. Three, that in the majority of
jurisdictions, the underlying decision as to appointment of counsel to those
defendants in need has hinged on the question of whether defendant has
funds sufficient to interest a competent private attorney in the community
to handle his case. In many courts the trend in eligibility systems has
shifted from a subjective, haphazard method of determination to an objec-
tive, orderly procedure to decide eligibility. In other jurisdictions, court
officials have become aware that a standard method of appointment of
counsel is now necessary in light of constitutional and practical considera-
tions.
A number of surveys have uncovered a list of factors and standards
which a majority of judges consider in their determination of eligibility.54
51 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2.
52 SVERSTE]N, supra note 2, at 105, 106, 109.
53 lnfra note 54.
54National Legal Aid and Defender Association conducted a definitive nation*ide
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A list of such factors, with commentary and recommendations, include the
following:
Income: Initially, income may be classified into salary types and sources. 5
As to types, three may be distinguished: gross, net, and take-home.
Gross income is the total amount of earnings while net is the full amount
minus withholding taxes. Take-home pay is the gross amount less taxes and
all miscellaneous deductions such as union dues, credit union deposits, bills,
etc. Consequently, there may exist a large disparity between gross and
take-home income. Net income most accurately reflects true income be-
cause the net amount is all the available money the wage earner has avail-
able to pay for expenses. Gross income, on the other hand, paints a brighter
financial picture than is real, while take-home income distorts wage earn-
ings because all deductions other than taxes are disbursements into asset
accounts or are payments of living expenses, which ordinarily come out of
the funds brought home.
As to sources, the wage earner accused must make his salary available.
In addition, some courts and agencies look to other family members' in-
comes; if the defendant is an adult, to the wife, if the defendant is a
minor, to the parents.56 However, such recourse to third parties for sources
of funds to reimburse counsel is, practically speaking, burdensome and of
questionable constitutionality. In many cases the accused may be the pri-
mary wage earner, the spouse working to supplement the family income.
To garnish the spouse's wages after the accused is incarcerated leaves the
family with no continuing income. In addition, in criminal cases, the ex-
traction of attorney's fees from spouses and parents may illegally deprive
survey of all facets of the administration of criminal justice for the poor, including
eligibility determinations. Lee Silverstein edited the findings of the individual state in-
vestigators in volumes 2 and 3 of DEFENSE OF THE PooR and summarized the findings
in one volume, supra note 2. The International Legal Aid Association (London, England)
compiled a listing of criminal legal aid agencies and procedures in the United States in
the DIRECTORY OF LEGAL Am AND ADVICE FACIITEs THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, Vol. 2
(1966). With the cooperation of United Charities (Chicago, Illinois), a survey was taken
of 120 public defender offices located in 40 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and Canada, to supplement and to up-date past surveys of eligibility determination
procedures.
The follow-up survey asked two questions concerning eligibility determination for
appointment of counsel: (1) What, if any, standards and procedure does your office use
in determining who is an indigent? (2) If your office does not make such a determination,
who does? Briefly describe the standards, if any, they employ.
The conclusions and statements of this comment are in large part based on the findings
of such surveys, particularly the follow-up survey, and on the observations of the agencies
and attorneys responding.
55 DUANE AND KEAx, The Financial Eligibility Test of NLSP 12 (1966). (Neighborhood
Legal Services Project, United Planning Organization, Washington D.C.).
5 6 SILVESTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 109 (1965).
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them of property.5 7 One court noted, "While a moral obligation may re-
quire relatives to assist one another in such cases [appointment of coun-
sel], we know of no legal rule requiring it .. ."58 And regarding juveniles,
the parents likewise have no legal obligation to provide their children with
counsel.5" Due process requires the public to provide counsel where the ac-
cused is unable to; neither due process nor any other constitutional tenet
can require the defendant's relatives to provide counsel.
A number of courts and agencies employ "poverty" income guidelines
established by various governmental organizations." ° Should a defendant
have an income over and above an established poverty income level (rela-
tive to the number of members in the family), that defendant becomes
automatically ineligible for appointed counsel.
Such a system suffers from two defects. First, the reliance on income as
the conclusive factor of eligibility avoids the financial realities of actual
living expenses and budgets. Cognizance should be taken of other factors,
as analyzed below, which add further evidence to the financial picture of
an individual and a family. Secondly, it is highly questionable that the
poverty income levels established are accurate reflections of average bud-
getary conditions.
Several public agencies publish figures which define the state of "pov-
erty." As an example, for an urban family of two adults and two children,
the Office of Economic Opportunity established the income level of $3200,
below which the family would be considered living in poverty.0 1 The Social
Security Administration developed a poverty yardstick of $3335 for the
same hypothetical family.6 2 A state body serving poor people set the family
57 The criminal law places the responsibility for the commission of a crime on the
person or persons who participate in one manner or another in the act. Cook, Act, In-
tention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 Yale L.J. 644 (1917). Conversely, no
responsibility can be placed on individuals not a party to the criminal act, i.e., spouses
or parents. Familial obligations should not be seized by the administrators of criminaljustice as a source for monetary liability where a member of a family individually breaks
a law of society.
58State v. Wright, 111 Iowa 621, 624 (1900); cited in Schmidt v. Uhlenhopp, supra
note 23. The question in regard to solvency is not whether the relatives have funds to
pay for counsel, but whether the defendant personally possesses the resources. Keur v.
State, supra note 28, at 549.
59 Parents are not generally liable in tort for their children's negligence, nor are parents
generally responsible for their children's criminal acts. PROSSER, TORTS 117 (3d ed. 1964).
This lack of responsibility extends not only to the act itself, but also to the defense cost
of the act.
60 AERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, MEmORANDUm ON RULES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR
LEGAL Am SERvIcEs (Jan. 19, 1966).
61 U.S. OFricE or EcoNomac OPPORTUNITY, REVISm POVERTY GUIDELINES POR FY 1968,
CommumTY AcTION MEmo, No. 74, November 15, 1967.
62 REPORT or THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON Cnrm DIsoRDERs 462 (1968).
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of four budget level at $3396. 63 Such figures, even lower for farm families,
make no adjustments for different sections of the nation or state. Further,
such figures are unrealistic. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, after studying
a number of metropolitan living patterns throughout the United States,
constructed "moderate" urban family budgets. The budgetary figures es-
tablished in every ihstance were, at the minimum, double the amount of
the poverty guideline figures cited above. 64 As an example, the total an-
nual budget estimated for Chicago, Illinois was $9190 for a four member
rental family.65 That figure is nearly triple other corresponding govern-
mental poverty figures.
The chasm between the two sets of standards may be further high-
lighted by an analysis of the allocation of expenses in a liveable budget
for a normal family. The cost distribution percentages below were trans-
posed into figures based on the OEO poverty guidelines of $3200.66
COST ALLOCATION OF MAJOR BUDGETARY ITEMS
Distribution Actual Cash Available
Item Percentages % Yearly $ Monthly $
Housing 22.2 710.40 59.20
Food 24.4 780.80 65.07
Clothing 8.7 278.40 23.20
Medical 5.5 176.00 14.07
Transportation 8.7 278.40 23.20
Personal 2.6 83.20 6.93
Other 8.2 262.40 21.87
Gifts 3.0 96.00 8.00
Insurance 2.7 86.40 7.20
Social Security 3.6 115.20 9.60
Taxes 10.4 332.80 27.73
Total 100.0 3200.00 3200.00
In addition to the story told by the figures, the use of income level stan-
dards runs contrary to the public theory behind appointed counsel. Appoint-
See also Orshansky, Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile, 28 SoCIAL
SECURITY BULLETIN, no. 1 (January, 1965) at pp. 3-29; and Who's Who Among the
Poor: A Demographic View oj Poverty, 28 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, no. 7 (July,
1965) at pp. 3-32.
6 8 Webb, MEmORANDUm ON THE NEW MODERATE BUDGET FOR METROPOLITAN CHICAGO 2
(1968) (Welfare Council of Chicago, Illinois); noting the State of Illinois Public As-
sistance guidelines.
6 4 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CITY WORKER'S
FAMILY BUDGET FOR A MODERATE LIVING STANDARD (1967).
65 As distinguished from a family who owns a home whose budget was estimated at
$10,174. Webb, supra note 63, at 4.
66 The items and percentage allocations were derived from Webb, supra note 63, at 6,
citirig CITY WORKER'S FAMILY BUDGET FOR A MODERATE LIVING STANDARD, supra note 64.
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ment of counsel should be looked upon not as a grant of public assistance
but as the providing of a constitutional right.67 Those eligible to receive
free counsel should not have to be destitute. As discussed above, some de-
fendants may have some funds available for fees but in an amount insuf-
ficient to hire adequate representation. 68
In the last analysis, caution must be observed in establishing an eligibility
"income level." Too high a figure may well over-burden present counsel
appointment systems. Too low a figure will deny counsel to those eligible.
Either too high or too low a figure will obviate the constitutional guarantee
of effective appointed counsel to those unable to afford an attorney.
To avoid the harsh results of employing set income levels as sole eligibility
criteria, the determination of eligibility should be made by deducting the
defendant's expenses (including family expenses) from the resources avail-
able to the defendant. 69 Such a system uncovers the actual amount of funds
available for counsel fees. The determination can then be made by deciding
whether the funds available are sufficient to afford the accused an adequate
representation. Analyzed in the following section and appended to this com-
ment is a financial eligibility form structured to allow the determiner of
eligibility to obtain a true picture of the actual financial status of the de-
fendant.70
Assets: Assets include sources of funds excluding income, such as finan-
cial accounts, personal property and real property. Assets which may be
available for counsel costs must be easily convertible and not necessary
to adequate family living,71 as private attorneys do not generally accept
67 What may be considered a poverty income for public assistance grant may not be
a poverty guideline for legal aid. Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty
Program, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 211, 218 (1966). Legal Aid services more nearly
parallel medical clinics where no fixed scale of eligibility is employed, rather the amount
of free medical services is related to the amount of funds the patient has available after
necessary living expenses have been deducted. See, Meeman and Long, Aid for the
Medically Indigent, 16 ViAND. L. REv. 173 (1962).
68"The terms 'indigent' or 'indigency' should be avoided . . .[T]hey suggest, not
financial inability to obtain some essential defense service, but a total absence of re-
sources." 1963 Arr'Y GEN. REP. Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal
Justice 41 (1963). The concept of indigency confuses the question of right to coutnsel
with the issue of eligibility for receipt of public welfare assistance. Such terminology
should be avoided because of its implication of destitution-being completely without
funds. The phrases "not financially able," "unable to afford," "inability to employ,"
more properly mean a test of need which recognizes the relative costs of defense in
relation to the particular circumstances of the accused's case. Mazor, The Right to be
Provided Counsel: Variations on a Familiar Theme, 9 UTAH L. Rxv. 50 (1964).
69The equation stated: disposable funds--expenditures = resources available for
counsel fees.
7 0 See Appendix.
71 Supra note 55, at 18.
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credit and many require a cash retainer with a reasonable certitude of future
payments in full.72
Financial accounts include bank assets, stocks, bonds, life insurance and
other investments. These resources are accumulated in excess of funds
needed for living and family expenses and are, in most instances, easily
available for attorney fees.
Personal property encompasses all personal and household possessions of
the family. Such property generally is a necessary adjunct to family living,
and any resale value is normally nominal. Thus, such assets should not in
most instances be considered as sources of fees. In some cases however, the
value of the family automobile should be listed as an available asset, such
as where the automobile is relatively new, since the high value automobile,
determined by its year and model, is not a necessity to the family living
pattern. 73
Real property should not be considered as a fee fund where the property
involved is the mortgaged residence of the defendant. The mortgaged house
has little convertible equity, and the mortgage payments approximate rent
payments, legitimate and necessary family expenses. To demand of the de-
fendant the acquisition of a second mortgage may seriously jeopardize the
accused's financial situation. Where the real property involved is not a
residence, the property should be considered as a convertible asset unless
the property is low valued and the defendant relies on the property as a
source for his sole income, or unless other unusual circumstances exist.
74
Certain assets which are not necessary and easily convertible should be
exempted from available sources for attorney's fees. A specific sum should
be protected for unexpected family emergencies. The right to appointed
counsel systems should not attempt to siphon off all available asset funds.7 5
Consideration should be given to probable family emergencies, to the size,
health, and condition of the defendant's family, and to the age of the
defendant. These expectancies should be provided for or compensated for
by deducting $300 for the family and $100 for each unemancipated child
under the age of twenty-one or other dependents. These amounts should be
deducted from the total money amount of convertible assets available for
fees.
Expenses: Living expenses comprise numerous factors. While rent and mort-
gage payments, actual housing expenses, can be readily determined, no cor-
72 Note, Representation of Indigents in California-A Field Study of the Public De-
fender and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522, 545 (1961).
73 Supra note 55, at 18.
74 Supra note 39.
75 Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and
Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Mrx. L. Rav. 1 (1963).
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respondingly accurate figure is available for the other costs of normal,
moderate living. However, reliable, realistic estimates of such costs do exist.
Governmental and private agencies in metropolitan areas, after making
studies of patterns of living, have established budgetary standards for family
expenses. 76 Such guidelines should be employed in the expenses-resources
method of determining eligibility proposed above and analyzed in the fol-
lowing section.77 These standards are subject to defects similar to those of
set poverty income levels, discussed above, but by a thorough examination
and study of normal, moderate living patterns by governmental and private
agencies in states and in counties, reliable and realistic figures can be es-
tablished and employed as guidelines for family expenses. Periodic review
of such standards will further assure their reliability and accuracy.
Bail: Whether or not the payment of bail affects eligibility determination
depends on the judge and the jurisdiction. Either: one, counsel is never
appointed where the defendant is out on bail; two, counsel is rarely ap-
pointed where the accused is free; three, courts consider the payment of
bail as one factor among others indicative of non-eligibility; or, four, courts
disregard bail as determinative of any showing.78 The last alternative re-
flects the best approach. In recent years the entire bail procedure has been
questioned and experimented with.79 Rather than require a cash deposit or
a surety bond, many courts have released prisoners on recognizance bonds
or on a cash deposit of ten percent of the bail.80 In many instances, defen-
dants regain their freedom pending trial without depositing any or much
money for bail. It is in these cases where bail should no longer be considered
a factor of eligibility.
On the other hand, where courts set bail for defendants, such bail, if
paid, should not automatically preclude appointment of counsel. Inquiry
should be made into the amount and source of the funds.8 ' In a large num-
ber of instances, the bail may be posted by one not legally bound to render
payments; 82 and from a constitutional standpoint, the use of the bail stan-
dard places the defendant in a position to choose between counsel or free-
76 Supra note 55, at 8.
77 Supra note 69, and infra text between footnotes 95 and 97. On the eligibility form
in Appendix B, the estimated expense would be listed as "Family Expenditure Figure."
78 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 107.
79 GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERicAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965); Proceed-
ings of Conference on Bail and Indigency, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
80 Botein, The Manhattan Bail Project: Its Impact on Criminology and the Criminal
Law Processes, 43 TEXAs L. REV. 319 (1965); McCarthy and Wahl, supra note 38; ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 110-7 (1967).
81 See Mazor, supra note 68, at 79.
82 AmnicA BAR AssocIATioN, PaovImo DEFENSE SERvIcEs 55 (1967) [handbook].
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dom. Such a dilemma may deny the defendant the right to an effective de-
fense.83
Extenuating Circumstances: In addition to the stark objective factors out-
lined above, an inquiry into any unusual circumstances of the defendant's
financial status permits a flexible and discretionary method of determining
eligibility. A definitive listing of such factors is not practical nor possible
because each accused has a unique economic set-up. Nevertheless, the fac-
tors discussed below indicate some common extenuating circumstances. Any
outstanding debts incurred by the defendant or his family, past or present
periods of unemployment, geographical proximity of relatives and friends,
the number of dependents, 8 4 whether the accused receives social security or
pension payments, whether the defendant or the defendant's family re-
ceives public assistance, these and other matters, if present, should be
taken into consideration to effectively determine eligibility.
Summary. The surveys point up that a majority of judges question the
defendant as to one or more of the above factors.8 5 But at the same time,
few judges question as to all of the matters, and thus, the incomplete inquiry
turns out to be inexact and constitutionally unsound. To objectively deter-
mine eligibility, the interviewer should question the defendant regarding all
the factors above and whatever else may be pertinent.
Further, many judges employ certain precluding factors, such as bail and
income, which automatically render the accused ineligible.86 Such standards
should be eliminated. Eligibility should not be based on one sole factor
but on the totality of factors.
Distinct from the objective criteria above, a large variety of procedural
methods are employed by different judges and counties. Such procedures
range from affidavit signings to in-depth investigations. Seemingly every
practical approach has been attempted and experimented with in the juris-
dictions surveyed. Rather than attempt a detailed analysis of the approaches,
proposals follow in the next section, which are in large part a coalescence of
the many reported procedures.
831d.; Moore, Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44 ORE. L. REV. 255, 264
(196).
84 Studies published by various agencies suggest that children under the age of six
cost $3 to $4 less per week to support than children between the ages of 6-12, while
children over the age of 12 cost about $4 to $5 more per week to support than those in
the 6-12 age group. DUANE and KEANE, supra note 55, at 17. Such figures could be con-
sidered in estimating the "Family Expenditure Figure," discussed supra text between
footnotes 75 and 77 inclusive.
8
sSupra note 55.
86 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 108.
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PROPOSALS FOR THE DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY
Recommendations for a constitutionally sound procedure to guarantee ap-
pointed counsel to the eligible should contain the following guidelines:
8 7
Objective Standards. Specific standards should be employed as
flexible and discretionary guidelines.
Initially, such standards should be objective yet flexible, accurately re-
flective of the defendant's financial condition, yet not burdensome to obtain
or verify. No one factor should automatically make the accused eligible,
nor should any one factor preclude appointment of counsel. In the last
analysis, all factors, common and extenuating, should be considered. The
foregoing list of past and present criteria with recommended changes, out-
lined in the preceding section, indicate the type of economic yardstick that
should be considered.
Uniform Questionnaire. To accurately ascertain the objective factors, the
defendant requesting counsel should be required to complete a
written questionnaire.
A uniform mode of employing the same flexible standards would effectively
guarantee the right of appointed counsel to those eligible. The written
questionnaire, would best implement that mode. The written inquiry com-
pleted by the defendant affords uniformity to eligibility determination and
a degree of certainty to findings. The state-wide use of a model questionnaire
would eliminate constitutional infirmities of equal protection. Appended to
this comment in Appendix A is a model questionnaire listing the common
factors indicative of the defendant's financial status.
Due process requires counsel to be appointed at the initial stage of the
accusatory process where the accused requests it.88 The model questionnaire
should be submitted to the accused at the time of defendant's request to
ascertain his eligibility. The questionnaire may thus have to be submitted
at the police detention center where the police intend to interrogate the ac-
cused; such submittance may become part of the "booking" process or a
separate step, depending on police practices.8 9 Or the questionnaire may have
to be given to the defendant before or at the time of his appearance before
the magistrate or judge. In any event, whenever the defendant requests ap-
87 The recommendations herewith are proposals compiled from an analysis and inter-
pretation of the many procedures reported in the surveys, supra note 54, and enacted in
many state statutes.
s8 Supra note 31.
89 Supra note 82, at 63.
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pointed counsel and due process concurrently requires counsel to be present,
the questionnaire should be submitted and completed. In many instances, the
defendant will need help in filling out the questionnaire. To better assure a
correctly completed form, the party who hands the defendant the ques-
tionnaire could also act as an interviewer and explainer and should act when
the defendant does not understand the questionnaire due to ignorance, illiter-
acy, or other reasons.
Thorough Investigation. To verify the defendant's answer and to discover
new facts, an investigation should be made by some third party.
A follow-up investigation of the information supplied on the questionnaire
would eliminate nearly all doubt as to the defendant's financial status by
verifying the accused's approximations and by uncovering any other facts.
Such investigations would further establish a sufficient record upon which
the defendant could appeal.
Investigations need not be made of the defendant's questionnaire com-
pleted in the police station.90 To demand or propose an investigation at this
stage would be impractical. Where the police want to interrogate the ac-
cused, the defendant's request, completion of the questionnaire, and state-
ment of inability to afford counsel are sufficient evidence of eligibility, and
counsel should be appointed. The cost of counsel appointed to an ineligible
defendant is nominal at this stage, whereas the constitutional price of non-
appointment to an eligible defendant is great.
Initially, the investigation should proceed after the defendant has com-
pleted the questionnaire, and either before or after the judge apprises the
defendant of his constitutional rights. An investigation beforehand would
speed up the courtroom procedures at the initial hearing. However, where
the defendant did not fill out a questionnaire at the police station and where
the defendant is free on bail, the first opportunity for the court officer to
interview the defendant arises at the arraignment. Accordingly, where the
defendant is free on bail, after he appears before the judge and requests
appointed counsel, a recess in the proceedings should follow during which
time the defendant can complete the questionnaire and the investigation can
be made.91 The length of the recess would depend on the time a thorough
investigation would take, and that, in turn, would depend on the mode of
the procedural investigation. Where the defendant is incarcerated pending
the first hearing, a court official could interview the defendant in jail and
90 At later stages of the prosecuting process when more time is available, a more
thorough investigation can be made.
9 1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 113-3 (1967).
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investigate the information received. 92 Where the defendant has completed
a questionnaire at the police station, an investigation could verify the in-
formation before the time for the arraignment.
No one single investigatory procedure can be proposed. Just as no nation-
wide system of eligibility can be effectively implemented, no single state-wide
system can be established. The volume of criminal law proceedings and the
population of the counties affect the type of investigation employed. 93
Accordingly, in counties where the population is below 150,000, primarily
rural areas where the volume of criminal prosecution is low, the clerk of the
court should handle the investigation. In less densely populated counties,
most residents know or know about each other, and much of the ques-
tionnaire information can be verified by personal knowledge about the ac-
cused by court officials or the judge.94 Where the defendant is not well
known or is a transient, further investigation by means of telephone calls or
letters to relatives, friends, employers, will yield the needed verification. In
some instances, still further investigations may be necessary, and again this
should be handled by the clerk of the court.
In jurisdictions where the population runs between 150,000 and 500,000,
primarily medium size population centers where the volume of criminal
hearings is moderate to large, the investigatory work, too burdensome for
the clerk of the court to handle, should be handled by other court officials,
or by separate public welfare agencies, or by a special part-time or full-time
court investigator. 95 Whoever the interviewers are, the means employed to
substantiate the questionnaire's figures and to garner new facts, would be
similar. Again, telephone calls, personal interviews, and other probe methods,
should be employed to accurately corroborate the written inquiry informa-
tion.
In counties where the population exceeds 500,000, primarily urban areas
where the volume of criminal proceedings is great, several full-time special
court investigators should carry on investigations. Again, these investigators
would employ telephone calls, letters and visitations to thoroughly investi-
gate. These same investigators could interview the defendants initially con-
cerning the questionaire and continue with the investigation to substantiate
the inquiry. The price of the additional court officials would be minimal in
relation to attorney's and court's time saved and in light of the constitutional
right to counsel guarantee.
92See Silverstein, The New Ontario Legal Aid System and Its Significance for the
United States, 25 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 83, 86 (1967).
93 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 116-119.
94 Moore, supra note 83, at 259.
95 Supra note 60.
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Eligibility Determination Form. To interpret the economic facts and figures,
the investigator should complete the "Eligibility Determination Form."
As proposed in the preceding section, the determination of eligibility
should be based on the amount of funds the defendant has available after
an analysis of his income, assets, expenses, bail, and extenuating circum-
stances. The questionnaire provides the facts, the interrogation verifies the
information, and the "eligibility determination form" interprets such facts
in a uniform and reliable manner and puts the defendant's financial status
in perspective. The eligibility form shows the resources the defendant has
available after expenditures have been deducted from the accused's income
and assets and after any extenuating circumstances have been noted.9 6
The investigator, after completing the examination, should fill in the re-
spective figures in the corresponding spaces on the form from all the infor-
mation available. Some of the information will be subject to the investigator's
discretion and interpretation, particularly cases of extenuating circum-
stances, but the objective factors and standards themselves afford a nearly
exact financial picture of the accused's status. Such compilation acts both
as a guide to a more certain determination of eligibility and as a recommen-
dation to the judge who makes the final decision.
Determination. Before the first judicial hearing, the determination should
be made by a law enforcement or court official on the basis of the
questionnaire. After arraignment, the determination should be made
by a judge or magistrate on the basis of the questionnaire,
the investigation, and the eligibility form.9 7
At any stage prior to the first judicial hearing, where due process requires
and the accused demands counsel, a preliminary determination of eligibility
for appointed counsel should be made by a law enforcement official or court
officer based on the completed questionnaire and the accused's statement that
he cannot afford counsel.
At the first judicial hearing, the final determination should be made by
the judge on the basis of the facts of the questionnaire, of any further infor-
mation obtained by the investigation, and by the recommendations of the
eligibility determination form. The judge should rely on the facts and figures
to guide him, should check the eligibility determination form for accuracy
and completeness, and should question the defendant to clear up any am-
biguity. In the end, the judge should make certain that the defendant has
sufficient funds for hired counsel before refusing to appoint counsel.
9 6 See Appendix B.
97 SuPra note 82, at 63.
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Referral Committee. If the judge is not certain whether the defendant is
eligible, he should refer the accused to a committee of
private attorneys who would then decide eligibility.
Not all eligibility determinations will be black and white; a large number
will be gray. Where the judge is not certain as to the accused's eligibility,
the judge should refer the accused to private attorneys who would then de-
termine whether the defendant has sufficient funds to hire adequate counsel.
In metropolitan areas the private attorneys could be organized by local bar
associations into three member committees who would interview the defen-
dant and review the questionnaire and eligibility form.9 8 If the committee
should decide the defendant has sufficient funds to hire counsel, one of the
three attorneys should take the case for a fee or refer him to an attorney
who will.99 On the other hand, if the committee should decide the defen-
dant is without sufficient funds, the committee should refer the defendant
back to the judge for appointment of counsel. 100 If the committee discovers
the defendant to have some funds available but not an adequate amount to
obtain representation, the committee should refer the defendant back to the
judge and recommend that counsel be appointed and that the accused pay
to the court a specific amount of money.' 0 '
In rural areas, the committee set-up may not be feasible because of geo-
graphical distance or too few attorneys. In these cases, the judge should
refer the defendant to three private attorneys from a list of attorneys com-
piled by the local bar association or by the judge.10 2
In the end, the judge should make certain the defendant, if he desires,
has counsel, appointed or hired.'03
98 Connally, Problems in the Determination of Indigency for the Assignment of Counsel,
1 GEO. ST. B.J. 1115 (1964).
99 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMVIITTEE OF THE BAR AssOCIATION OF SAN FRANcIsco
CONCERNING THE OSFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN SAN FRANcIsco (1962).
100 Trebach, A Modern Defender System for New Jersey, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 289, 325
(1957).
'01 Each defendant should contribute to the cost of his defense in proportion to his
means. The committee would determine the defendant's funds available for defense costs
based on disposable income less living expenses and then set the actual amount of the
contribution and the mode of payment. See Utton, The British Legal Aid System, 76
YA.E L.J. 371, 373 (1966).
102 Supra note 100.
103 One observer listed a number of alternative procedures which judges have taken
after determining the defendant to be non-eligible for appointed counsel: one, merely
tell the defendant that he is not eligible; two, tell the defendant he may retain his own
lawyer if he wishes; three, if the defendant wants, appoint an attorney who arranges his
fee with the accused; four, refer the defendant to the local bar association or lawyer
referral service; five, hand the defendant a list of available private attorneys; and, six,
appoint counsel regardless of the defendant's financial standing. Gerard, A Preliminary
Report on the Defense of Indigents ti Missouri, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 270, 303 (1964).
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If after the private attorneys refer the defendant back to the judge recom-
mending appointment of counsel, the judge refuses to do so, one of the at-
torneys should appeal the decision by an appeal or by a writ of mandamus
or prohibition.10 4 Lawyers, as well as judges, have a responsibility to see to
it that the administration of criminal justice is fair and orderly.
CONCLUSION: THE BEGINNING
The constitutional administration of criminal justice cannot survive with-
out uniformity and order. The preceding recommendations attempt to pro-
vide such a framework for the doctrine of appointed counsel. To make ac-
cessible that particular right to the poor, standards, objective and flexible,
and procedures, practical and viable, should be established by Supreme Court
rule or statutory legislation in every state.10 5 Such enactments can be struc-
tured on the model proposed in this comment.
The standards and procedures adopted in any state will depend on a
myriad of factors. The preceding recommendations may not all be applicable
to a particular state's criminal administration procedure.' 06 The ques-
tionnaire may be more succinct, the investigation less thorough, the eligibility
determination form eliminated, the referral system expanded; the realities
and the structure of each state's counsel appointment system will guide the
formation of eligibility determination.
The proposals set forth do not alleviate all the problems inherent in the
administration of court appointed or retained counsel. The means of reim-
bursement of counsel, the source of such funds, the feasibility of combining
release on recognizance bonds with the determination of eligibility, the de-
cision of who is to pay for the poor person's court costs in addition to
104 See cases supra note 23.
105 Many states and counties have enacted Public Defender Acts or other legislation
dealing with counsel appointment procedures and eligibility determination. In addition,
a number of courts have adopted similar provisions by court rule. MD. CT. App. R. 719;
and N.M. S. CT. R. 92.
108 Some observers in a number of states have noted that the states' present method
of determining eligibility is highly accurate and reliable, and any investigatory procedure
would be expensive and cause additional delay in criminal prosecution. Manson, The
Indigent in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 163, 168 (1965) ; Remington, Defense of the Indigent
in Wisconsin, Wis. B. BiuLL. (February, 1964) 40, 43; Moore, supra note 83, at 259.
Further studies in these areas may be necessary to determine whether current procedures
are just and reliable. But statistics must not cloud over the fact that the constitutional
right to counsel extends to aN defendants without sufficient funds to hire an attorney,
and that any eligibility procedure must aim to appoint counsel to all eligible and not
just to most defendants. In the majority of cases, defendant's eligibility for counsel will
be black or white. However, where the accused's financial picture is grey the judge will
need to turn to other sources of reliable and accurate information-to the questionnaire,
or the investigation, or the referral committee, or any combination of the three.
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attorney's fees, such as filing, witness, and miscellaneous costs, all remain for
local governments, courts, and bar associations to resolve.
The poor man deprived of his freedom in any significant manner is entitled
to the same rights and privileges as a wealthy person. Equality of representa-
tion may not be possible. Nevertheless, invidious discrimination which in-
fringes on the poor person's constitutional rights must be eliminated. 10 7
When the Supreme Court announced that poverty was "constitutionally an
irrelevance," the Court for all time removed the economic stigma from con-
stitutional rights and liberties, including the right to counsel.'08 In the last
analysis, "inequalities in economic status should not preclude the attain-
ment of equal justice for the poor."' 09 Rather, the appointed counsel system
must serve those who are unable because of poverty to procure legal aid
elsewhere.
APPENDIX A
FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY QUESTIONAIRE
People of the State of_
vs. Case No.
I. General Information
a) Name
b) Street Address Zip Code
City State _
c) Age_ Social Security No._ Phone No.
d) Marital Status: Single__ Married._. Separated._ Divorced-
e) Dependents:
Wife__ Children, No- Others, No-. Relationship -
f) If under the age of 21, list your parents' names and addresses:
II. Employment
a) Presently employed Presently Unemployed
b) Name of Present Employer
Street Address City
State Zip Code Phone No._
c) Net Income: Weekly $ _ Monthly $
107 Pye, The Administration of Criminal Justice, 66 COLUm. L. REV. 286 (1966).
108 Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941).
10 9 R. H. SMITH, JUsTICE AND THEPOOR 211 (1919).
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d) Description of Job
e) Length of time employed
f) Last Prior Employer
III. Financial Status
1. Owner of Real Property Yes_____ No_____
a) Description
b) Address
c) In whose name listed?
d) Estimated value $ _ $
e) Annual income from property $ $
f) Debt on Property:
Owed to $
2. Owner of Other Property
a) Automobile: Make_ Year
In whose name registered?
Present Estimated value $
b) Cash on Hand$
c) Cash in Bank:
Savings Account $ _ Checking Account $
Names and addresses of Banks and Savings Associations:
d) Other investments (stocks, bonds, life insurance, other):
e) Other sources of income (pension fund, social security benefits,
public assistance, unemployment com-
pensation, alimony, other):
IV. Expenditures
a) Housing:
Monthly house Or apartment rent $
Monthly mortgage payment $
b) Other debts:
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To Whom Owed Amount Owed$.
$.
$.
$.
$
Monthly Debt payments ............... $
V. Present Status
a) In custody - b) Free on Recognizance bond__
c) Free on bail in amount of $ , put up by
., and secured by
The bondsman is , who was
paid $
VI. Summary Questions
a) Are you able to obtain financial help to raise funds for your
defense costs? Yes- No_
If yes, who or what is the source?
b) Have you ever been represented by court appointed counsel in
the past? Yes- No_
If yes, what was the city and state?
c) Do you wish the Court to appoint an attorney? Yes .
No
VII. References
List below the names and addresses of three people who are familiar
with your financial condition.
Date
Signature
Administrative Information
Interviewer
Investigator
Judge
Eligible Not Eligible- Referred to Committee-
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APPENDIX B
ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FORM
People of the State of
VS.
I. Funds Available
Net Income
Defendant $
Others $$
$
Other Cash Income
Real Property $
Other Sources of Income $
$
$
Total Income Available
Assets
Automobile $
Cash on Hand $
Cash in Bank $
Other investments $
Exemption $
Assets Available
Total Funds Available
II. Expenditures
Family Expenditure Figure $
Monthly Rent or
Mortgage Payments $
Monthly Debt Payments $
Special Circumstances $
$.
Total Expenditures
III. Available Funds for Defense
Costs
IV. Other Considerations
Defendant's Funds Applied
Towards Bail
Case No.
$
$
$
$
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Estimation of Counsel Fees
for Defense
Estimation of Other Defense
Costs
Administrative Information
Form Completed By
Counsel Appointed Counsel Not Appointed
Referred to Committee_
